The Two Handles

T he enlightened ruler controls his ministers with two handles. Just two. The first is punishment. The second is favor. By punishment I mean killing and penalty. By favor I mean praise and reward. A minister fears being put to death and wants to be rewarded — so if the ruler keeps both handles in his own hand, the ministers fear his power and chase the things he can give. What the enlightened ruler uses to guide and control his ministers is two handles, and nothing more. The two handles are punishment and favor. What is meant by punishment and favor? It is said: killing and execution are called punishment; praise and reward are called favor. Those who serve as ministers fear being put to death and penalized, and find profit in praise and reward. So if the ruler himself wields his punishment and favor, then the assembled ministers fear his authority and turn toward his benefits.

The corrupt ministers of the age do the opposite. The man they hate, they get the ruler to condemn. The man they love, they get the ruler to reward. So the prizes and the penalties no longer issue from the ruler at all. He listens to his minister and hands down the minister's verdicts. Then the whole country fears the minister and treats the ruler as nothing — turns toward the minister, turns away from the lord. This is what happens when a ruler loses his two handles. The treacherous ministers of the age are not like this. The one they hate, they manage to get from their ruler and condemn; the one they love, they manage to get from their ruler and reward. Now if the ruler does not make the authority of reward and punishment, its prizes and its threats, issue from himself — but listens to his minister and carries out that minister's rewards and punishments — then the people of the whole state all fear the minister and slight their ruler, turn toward the minister and abandon their lord. This is the calamity of a ruler losing his punishment and favor.

A tiger masters the dog with its claws and teeth. Strip the claws and teeth off the tiger and hand them to the dog, and the tiger ends up serving the dog. A ruler is the man who controls his ministers with punishment and favor. Let go of them, hand them to a minister, and the ruler ends up controlled by the minister. Now the reason a tiger can subdue a dog is its claws and teeth. Make the tiger release its claws and teeth and let the dog use them, then the tiger is on the contrary subdued by the dog. The ruler is one who controls his ministers by punishment and favor. Now if the one who rules men releases his punishment and favor and lets a minister use them, then the ruler is on the contrary controlled by the minister.

“A tiger masters the dog with its claws and teeth. Let the dog borrow them, and the tiger ends up serving the dog.”

Take Tian Chang. Up above he requested ranks and salaries from his lord and handed them out to the other ministers; down below he used an oversized measure to dole out grain to the common people. This is Duke Jian losing the favor-handle and Tian Chang putting it to use. And so Duke Jian was murdered. Thus Tian Chang, above, requested ranks and stipends and dispensed them to the assembled ministers; below, he used a large measure to give out grain to the hundred families. This was Duke Jian losing the favor and Tian Chang using it. And so Duke Jian was assassinated.

Zihan said to the ruler of Song: "Praise and reward, gifts and grants — these are what the people love. You hand them out yourself, my lord. Killing and penalties — these are what the people hate. Let me, your servant, take charge of those." So the ruler of Song lost the punishment-handle and Zihan put it to use. And so the ruler of Song was overpowered. Zihan said to the ruler of Song: "Praise, reward, gifts, and grants are what the people delight in — let my lord carry these out himself. Killing, execution, and penalty are what the people hate — let me, your servant, take charge of these." Thereupon the ruler of Song lost the punishment and Zihan used it. And so the ruler of Song was coerced.

Tian Chang used the favor-handle alone, and Duke Jian was killed. Zihan used the punishment-handle alone, and the ruler of Song was overpowered. So if the ministers of our own age get to wield both handles together, then the danger to today's rulers is worse than what came to Duke Jian and the ruler of Song. The fact is plain: of rulers who were coerced, murdered, hemmed in and kept blind, there has never yet been one who had not first lost his two handles and handed them to a minister. Tian Chang used only favor and Duke Jian was assassinated; Zihan used only punishment and the ruler of Song was coerced. So if the ministers of the present age wield both punishment and favor together, then the danger to the rulers of this age is far greater than that of Duke Jian and the ruler of Song. Therefore, among rulers who were coerced, killed, hemmed in, and kept in the dark, one who did not lose his punishment and favor and let a minister use them, yet still came to no ruin — there has never been such a one.

When a ruler wants to shut out treachery, he checks whether the deed matches the name — that is, whether words match results. A minister states a proposal. The ruler assigns him the task on the strength of his words, and holds him to results that fit that exact task. Result fits the task, task fits the words: reward him. Result does not fit the task, task does not fit the words: punish him. When the ruler intends to prohibit treachery, he examines whether punishment and name agree — that is, whether the word matches the affair. One who serves as minister sets out his proposal in words; the ruler, on the basis of his words, assigns him the task, and solely on the basis of that task demands results from him. If the result fits the task and the task fits the words, reward him; if the result does not fit the task and the task does not fit the words, punish him.

So when a minister's words are big and his results small, the ruler punishes him. Not for the smallness of the result — but because the result did not match the name he claimed. And when a minister's words are small and his results big, the ruler punishes him too. Not because big results displease the ruler — but because the mismatch with the claimed name does more harm than a big result does good. So: punish. Thus when a minister's words are large but his result is small, he is punished — not punished for a small result, but punished because the result did not match the name. When a minister's words are small but his result is large, he too is punished — not that the ruler is displeased with a large result, but he holds that the failure to match the name does harm greater than the benefit of a large result. Therefore, punish.

Once, Marquis Zhao of Han got drunk and fell asleep. The keeper of the hat, seeing the ruler was cold, laid a robe over him. The marquis woke pleased and asked his attendants: "Who put the robe on me?" The attendants answered: "The keeper of the hat." The marquis then punished both the keeper of the robe and the keeper of the hat. He punished the keeper of the robe for failing at his own job; he punished the keeper of the hat for overstepping his office. It was not that he did not mind the cold — he held that trespassing on another man's office did more harm than the cold. In the past, Marquis Zhao of Han got drunk and fell asleep. The keeper of the hat, seeing that the ruler was cold, therefore laid a garment over the ruler. Waking from sleep, he was pleased, and asked his attendants: "Who laid the garment on me?" The attendants replied: "The keeper of the hat." The ruler thereupon punished both the keeper of the robe and the keeper of the hat. He punished the keeper of the robe because he had failed at his duty; he punished the keeper of the hat because he had overstepped his office. It was not that he did not hate the cold — he held that the harm of encroaching on an office was greater than the cold.

So when the enlightened ruler keeps his ministers, a minister may not earn merit by reaching past his office, and may not state a proposal that does not pan out. Reach past your office: death. Words that do not match: punishment. Each man holds to the work of his post, and what he says is true to it — then the ministers cannot form factions and cover for one another. Therefore, when the enlightened ruler keeps his ministers, a minister may not gain merit by overstepping his office, and may not put forward words that do not match. Overstepping the office means death; failing to match means penalty. Each guards the business of his office, and what he proposes is faithful — then the assembled ministers cannot form cliques and act for one another.

Now the deeper trap. A minister's loyalty is not real love for his ruler — it is the pull of heavy profit. Watch what rulers reveal of themselves. The king of Yue liked bravery, so his people made light of dying. King Ling of Chu liked slim waists, so the state was full of starving men. Duke Huan of Qi was jealous and fond of his women, so Shu Diao castrated himself to run the harem; the duke liked fine flavors, so Yi Ya steamed his own son's head and served it up. The disposition of a minister is not necessarily able to love his ruler; it is for the sake of heavy profit. The king of Yue was fond of bravery, and many of his people made light of death. King Ling of Chu was fond of slender waists, and within the state there were many starving men. Duke Huan of Qi was jealous and fond of his women, so Shu Diao castrated himself in order to manage the inner palace; Duke Huan was fond of flavors, so Yi Ya steamed his own son's head and presented it.

So when a ruler shows what he hates, his ministers hide their real motives. When he shows what he likes, they fake the talent he wants. Let a ruler put his desires on display, and the ministers have the raw material to dress themselves to fit. That is how Zizhi leaned on a reputation for worth and stole his ruler's state; how Shu Diao and Yi Ya used their lord's appetites to encroach on him. The end of it: Zikuai died in the chaos, and Duke Huan lay unburied so long the worms crawled out the door. Therefore: drop what you like, drop what you hate, and the ministers show their plain selves. When the ministers show their plain selves, the great ruler cannot be blinded. So when the ruler shows what he hates, the ministers conceal their motives; when the ruler shows what he likes, the ministers counterfeit ability. When the ruler lets his desires be seen, the ministers gain the means to shape their attitudes. Thus Zizhi, relying on a name for worthiness, seized his ruler's state; Shu Diao and Yi Ya, using their ruler's desires, encroached upon him. In the end Zikuai died in the disorder, and Duke Huan's corpse bred worms that crawled out the door before he was buried. Why was this so? It was the calamity of a ruler lending his ministers his true feelings. Now if the ruler does not conceal his feelings and does not hide his motives, and lets ministers find a foothold to encroach on their lord, then it is no hard thing for the ministers to become a Zizhi or a Tian Chang. Therefore it is said: drop what you like, drop what you hate, and the ministers show their plain selves; when the ministers show their plain selves, the great ruler is not blinded.

二柄 The original Chinese · honored as an artifact

明主之所導制其臣者，二柄而已矣。二柄者，刑、德也。

Opening lines, classical Chinese · The Han Feizi 韓非子